Usefulness of Nuclear Weapons under Sino-soviet Case

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Usefulness of Nuclear Weapons under Sino-soviet Case

Why do states, as individual actors in the international context, want nuclear weapons? This essay is to apply a neo-realism analysis to the sino-soviet case towards the question. Realists reckon power as a means to the end of security. Therefore an argument is drawn here that states pursue nuclear weapons to guarantee state security.

Neorealists subscribe to a three ss theory: statism, self-help and survival, among which survival is viewed as the ultimate goal. Therefore, this essay follows the structure of three ss.

Statism

Max weber once define the state as the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory , on which neorealists concur. Within the territory, the state has the supreme authority to fulfill states security, even at the cost of individual liberty. Power, is therefore unarguable the first thing to organize according to neorealists.

Realists once gave two points on power. First, power is a relational concept that one excises power in relation to another; second, power is a relative concept and one needs to measure power capabilities of both himself and other states. From this perspective, a state needs both domestic and international power to secure itself. Therefore, nuclear weapons can be the means for a state to concentrate power.

Self-help

The idea of self-help indicates that one states quest for security is often anothers insecurity, therefore states can only fulfill security through self-help rather than depending on other states.

Nuclear weapons, as a powerful military means to shock and deter prospective enemies, can be the method of self-help for a state to implement security. The delicate tool for massive war, to some extent becomes the very tool for state security and peace.

In October 1954, during his visit in china, krushchev was surprised by president maos interest in nuclear weapon and anticipation soviet union would assist. After the sino-soviet agreement in 1955, soviet union began to dispatch nuclear specialists and infrastructures as well as equipment, but eventually rescinded the agreement and withdrew all specialists along with technology, equipment and blueprint. By June 1959 the Soviet Union had cut off all supplies to China’s nuclear programs.

There are a few points worth noting. First, when krushchev initially knew the interest of Chinese government in nuclear energy and weapons, he was hesitant and tried to convince that developing own nuclear weapon is costly and unnecessary as soviet union had already nuclear protection for china, whereas china government shall focus on economic construction. Fourth, the support and aid from soviet union was to some extents limited; restrictions were imposed on soviet specialists with regard to what knowledge could be lectured whereas what was confidential and not allowed to be revealed, or shall be instructed from Moscow through a communication line. What is more, Soviet intended to build substantial distance from china in first-line of the latest products, whereas only giving third-line or outdated equipment . Evidence was that the technology of the tested bomb in 1949 was from outdated American model rather than the more advanced 1951 one. Sixth, the cease of support was due to a series of incidents which arouse disagreement, according to some analysis.

If applying a neorealist analysis, these points may be better explained. As neorealists contend that state security can only be realized through self-help, and that one states quest for security is insecurity for another, chinas willingness to develop nuclear power was a means to find state security, but to some extents would place pressure on the regional community, threatening the security of soviet union, thereby explaining the shock and hesitation of krushchev. On another aspect, soviet union only concur on providing outdated and obsolete model, whereas declining to offer more advanced technology, restricting the lecturing of nuclear knowledge, not revealing the core technology which made the later Chinese own research have to start at the very beginning, was also to avert china from developing too powerful military power which might threat the hegemon of soviet union. Cases that manifest such threat are incidents that were reckoned as direct cause of unravelling of sino-soviet relation and disagreement, which leaded to the termination of aid from soviet union. one very important case was the shelling in Jinmen, which ussr was not consulted as ally, despite that krushchev had consecutively told mao although Taiwan issue is chinas internal affair, it has immense influence on the whole region and the socialism bloc . This incident showed the ambition of china in the control over regional affairs, whereas ignoring ussr was more a signal of insecurity to krushchev. therefore, the suspension of aid, to some extents can be interpreted as ussrs effort to reinforce state security through self-help.

On the other hand, china eventually resort to self-efforts in developing own nuclear power was also the reflect of achieving state security through self-help, whether the proposed slogan to make a break-through in three years, to master the technical know-how in five years, and to have atomic bombs in stock in eight years, or the report submitted by Nie Rongzhen, titled ‘Relying on Our Own Efforts to Solve the Issue of Materials for New Technology.

Survival

Nuclear deterrence theory, that once a state has acquired a secure second strike capability, that is the ability to retaliate after a pre-emptive first strike, states are relatively secure as the consequences for an attacker are so severe that no rational state leader would dare contemplate the devastating costs of a nuclear retaliation.

Both offensive and defensive neo-realists concur on the necessity of nuclear proliferation, as Kenneth waltz stated, world has never experienced longer peace after second world war ever since treaty of Westphalia, and this shall be explained by the presence of nuclear weapons. Offensive realists like john mearsheimer also recognize the importance of nuclear armament, whereas he agrees that the proliferation shall only happen among enlightened states. From these perspective, the armament of nuclear weapons can deter the prospective invasion, which explains the reason mao cherished high importance in nuclear weapons and resorted to soviet union for help. Armament of nuclear means the capability of nuclear retaliation, thereby deterring any latent invasions. From the standpoint of soviet union, preventing china from developing own nuclear power can strengthen chinas interdependence on soviet union, whereas it can use nuclear protection as negotiation chip in case conflicts happen in the future.

Unlike classical realists, who reckon human nature as the reason for interstates competitions, neorealists ascribe the conflicts to the state of anarchy, and contend that the ultimate goal of a state is to protect security and survive in the international environment. Under this context, in the very same case of soviet unions changing policies towards aid in china developing nuclear weapons, some other details shall be covered. First, in the soviet government statement made in 1955, its aim for providing technological and equipment support, is to promote the peaceful use of nuclear power and atomic energy . Second, krushchevs decision to support china for nuclear research, on one hand was to collaborate china to consolidate his authority in socialism bloc, on the other hand he needed support from china to overpower all other political enemies after the death of stalin. By assisting china to develop nuclear power, soviet union could be anticipating a stronger socialism bloc to maintain regional peace, whereas securing its leadership in socialism community. From this perspective, soviet union wanted nuclear weapons, though not for itself and not so eagerly, for a balance of power in the international society and its better survival in the battle in the cold war.

Even for a regional hegemon nuclear weapons are necessary for survival and state security, not to mention the salience of it for a relatively smaller state. To survive under the bipolar or even multipolar combat, nuclear weapons can be the tool to lessen the possibility a relatively smaller state falling into any side of the combat, or being forced to quit neutrality and eventually being sacrificed for the interests of a superpower.

Critiques

Realism is also confronting some critiques. Some made inquiry that is power really a means to an end? Or is it an end to itself? Where neorealism is divided into streams of offensive and defensive, the former deem power itself as an end whereas the latter argue power is only a means to achieve security. Offensive realism companies defensive realism on how much power states want. Under this context of necessity of developing nuclear weapons, the critiques can be the risk of proliferation and abuse of armament.

Though nuclear can be used to deter enemies, it seems not every state has the ration, As Sagan points out The assumption that states behave in a basically rational manner is of course an assumption, not an empirically tested fact’.

In a study of high-tech terrorism, eliot marshal made a quote from the president of nuclear control institute, paul Leventhal, that as state-sponsored terrorism grows, it is more plausible a terrorist obtains nuclear weapons. Therefore the abuse and proliferation of nuclear weapons becomes a non-neglectable question.

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